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IS TENNESSEE’S VERSION OF THE “JOCK 
TAX” UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
ALAN POGROSZEWSKI & KARI A. SMOKER 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jon DiSalvatore is in his tenth year as a professional hockey player.1  Over 
those 10 years, he has played in 725 professional games in the American 
Hockey League (AHL) and, until last year, had played in only 5 National 
Hockey League (NHL) games, all during the 2005–2006 season with the St. 
Louis Blues.2  On December 28, 2011, DiSalvatore was called up from 
Houston to join the NHL’s Minnesota Wild in Nashville to play in its game 
against the Predators.3  While playing in the NHL is still a dream of 
DiSalvatore’s, he did not expect the monetary price he would have to pay for 
the one game he played in the NHL last season. 
Jon DiSalvatore played under a two-way contract that paid him $550,000 
annually if at any time during the 2011–2012 season he performed services in 
the NHL.4  DiSalvatore’s contract thus afforded him slightly more than the 
$525,000 NHL league minimum.5  Had DiSalvatore performed services only 
 
  Alan Pogroszewski is an Assistant Professor of Sports Studies at St. John Fisher College and 
the President of his own tax consulting business, whose clientele include professional athletes 
performing services on three separate continents.  Prior to accepting his position at St. John Fisher 
College, Mr. Pogroszewski was the Vice President of Business Operations for Sports Consulting 
Group, a firm that specializes in the representation of professional hockey players.  Mr. Pogroszewski 
received his M.B.A. from Rochester Institute of Technology in 1996 and his M.S. in Taxation from 
St. John Fisher in 2003. 
  Kari A. Smoker is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the State University of New 
York, College at Brockport, and the President-Elect of the Greater Rochester Association of Women 
Attorneys, a chapter of the Women's Bar Association of the State of New York.  Ms. Smoker received 
her J.D. from The Ohio State University in 2000 and was admitted to the New York State Bar in 
2001.  She earned her M.S. in Taxation from Golden Gate University in 2010. 
1.  Jon DiSalvatore, ELITE PROSPECTS, http://www.eliteprospects.com/player.php?player=9451 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Jon DiSalvatore Game-by-Game Stats, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nhl/player/gamelog/_/id/2 
169/jon-disalvatore (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
4.  See Jon DiSalvatore, CAPGEEK.COM, http://www.capgeek.com/players/display.php?id=1523 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
5.  Collective Bargaining Agreement FAQs, NHL, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26366 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
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in the AHL, he would have earned his minor league salary, which was 
considerably less.  Because DiSalvatore played in only one game in the NHL 
last year, it is easy to determine the tax consequences for that particular game.  
The Minnesota Wild used 185 working days (duty days) during the 2011–2012 
NHL season in determining Mr. DiSalvatore’s daily earnings, which translated 
into $2,972.97 each day.6  His income earned for this one game in the NHL 
was then subject to both federal and state taxes in addition to Tennessee’s 
Professional Privilege Tax, a flat $2,500 fee assessed on NHL and National 
Basketball Association (NBA) players for the privilege of playing a game in 
Tennessee.7 
TABLE I 
Duty 
Days 
Salary 
Income 
Per 
Day 
Federal 
Tax 
Social 
Security 
Medicare 
Tennessee 
Privilege  
Tax 
Total  
Tax 
Net 
185 $550,000.00 $2,972.97 $489.05 $97.02 $43.11 $2,500.00 $3,129.18 -$156.21 
  
As the table above illustrates, the one game Jon DiSalvatore played in 
Nashville cost him a hefty price, resulting in a $156.21 net loss. 
With states looking for ways to increase their revenues, non-resident 
professional athletes are attractive targets for state tax collectors.  They cannot 
avoid the taxing jurisdiction because the cities in which they play are 
predetermined.8  Nor can non-resident athletes “express their displeasure in 
the voting booth.”9 
Much has been made of the “jock tax” and its implications for professional 
athletes.  It will generate over $3,000,000 annually in additional tax revenue 
 
6.  In this example, we use the method that the Minnesota Wild used in determining Jon 
DiSalvatore’s daily income, dividing his annual NHL salary by the 185 days during the 2011–2012 
NHL season.  Later in this article, we discuss a method for determining an appropriate allocation of 
income earned in a state as a non-resident.  This method includes adding the athlete’s preseason and 
postseason days.  See In re White, No. TSB-H-80-(93)-I, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 535, at *1–3 (Tax 
Comm’n June 20, 1980).  Using the method established in White, the example above would need to 
include the NHL preseason, which for the Minnesota Wild began on September 15, 2011.  Training 
camp scrimmages began on September 17, 2011.  2011–2012 Minnesota Wild Training Camp 
Scrimmages, MINN. WILD, http://wild.nhl.com/club/page.htm?id=73176 (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).  
However, players were required to report two days earlier for a media day and testing for 
conditioning, hence the September 15 start date.  Therefore, the total number of days would equal 
207. 
7.  TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, NOTICE #09-13, PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE TAX FOR 
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES (2009), available at http://www.tn.gov/revenue/notices/professional/09-
13.pdf [hereinafter NOTICE 09-13]. 
8.  See Robert D. Plattner, FTA Recommendations on Taxing Nonresident Athletes Could Have 
Wider Application, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES, Mar.–Apr. 1995, at 36, 36. 
9.  Id. 
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for the state of Tennessee alone.10  However, should Tennessee’s version of 
the jock tax prove to be unconstitutional, the state is susceptible to potential 
lawsuits from both the NHL Players’ Association and the National Basketball 
Player’s Association, costing it not only the tax revenue collected but also 
attorneys’ fees and the administrative costs it incurred in implementing the 
tax. 
Professional sports are a big business, and athletes need to be aware of the 
current financial landscape.  Taxes are a critical part of that landscape.11  With 
just under 1,000 full-time individuals performing services as professional 
athletes in the NHL and the NBA—and with nearly all players in both leagues 
scheduled to play in either Nashville or Memphis over the next several 
years—each one of these athletes needs to understand how he will be affected 
by this tax. 
Athletes like Jon DiSalvatore undoubtedly believe that Tennessee’s 
Professional Privilege Tax is unfair.  This article examines whether the tax is 
unconstitutional, and the notion of “fairness” is certainly an important 
consideration.  Section II outlines Tennessee’s version of the jock tax.  Section 
III discusses the constitutional constraints under both the Due Process Clause 
and the Commerce Clause that are imposed on a state’s power to lay taxes.  It 
also evaluates whether Tennessee’s jock tax is unconstitutional, examining 
(i) whether there is a sufficient connection that the state has with NHL and 
NBA athletes and their income; (ii) whether the tax is fairly apportioned; 
(iii) whether non-resident athletes are unfairly discriminated against, whether 
 
10.  Prior to the NHL lockout, the NHL’s Nashville Predators had forty-one home games 
scheduled during the 2012–2013 season.  See 2012–13 Wild Schedule Set, MINN. WILD (June 20, 
2012), http://wild.nhl.com/club/news.htm?id=635276.  Each NHL team is comprised of twenty 
players for games (eighteen skaters and two goaltenders as per rule 5.1 “Eligible Players” in the NHL 
Rule Book).  NHL OFFICIAL RULES 2011–2012 § 2-5.1.  With each player paying $2,500 in tax for 
each game played in the state, the total revenue produced is $2,200,000.  The NBA’s Memphis 
Grizzlies have forty-one home games scheduled during the 2012–2013 season.  Grizzlies Schedules & 
Results, GRIZZLIES.COM, http://www.nba.com/grizzlies/schedule#.USmZr-PZ8Vk (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2013).  Each NBA team is composed of twelve players, with at least eight dressed and able 
to play in any regular season game.  Roster Regulations, NBA (Oct. 22, 2001), http://www.nba.com/ 
analysis/00421026.html.  With each player paying $2,500 in tax for each game played in the state, 
this produces potential total revenue of $1,320,000.  During the 2012–2013 season, no NHL or NBA 
team, other than the Nashville Predators and the Memphis Grizzlies, is scheduled to play in 
Tennessee more than three times.  Should an individual athlete play more than three games in 
Tennessee over that time frame (such as a member of the Nashville Predators or the Memphis 
Grizzlies or an athlete who has switched teams during the season), he would not be subject to the 
$2,500 tax after his third game, as the tax is capped at a maximum of three games per player.  See 
infra Section II. 
11.  See generally Alan Pogroszewski, Is Canada Overstepping Its Borders?  The Alberta 
Province Tax Specifically Targets Professional Hockey Players in Order to Help Finance Its 
Professional Franchises, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 509 (2004). 
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the jock tax could have an adverse effect on interstate commerce, or both; and 
(iv) whether the services that non-resident athletes receive from Tennessee are 
in proportion to the tax they pay.  The article then concludes with the authors’ 
opinions that Tennessee’s version of the jock tax has gone too far. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Effective July 1, 2009, the Tennessee Department of Revenue began 
imposing a professional privilege tax on athletes who play in the NHL and 
NBA.12  Those athletes are assessed a $2,500 tax for each game they play, up 
to a maximum of three games, in the state of Tennessee.13  The tax is imposed 
whether they play for the Memphis Grizzlies, the Nashville Predators, or for 
an opposing team.14 
Non-resident taxation of professional athletes is nothing new.  The issue 
gained national attention in the early 1990s when Philadelphia began assessing 
a city tax on non-resident athletes and Illinois implemented a jock tax in 
retaliation against California’s non-resident tax, which was assessed to 
“Michael Jordan and his Chicago Bulls teammates following their 1991 
[NBA] Championship against the Los Angeles Lakers.”15  Despite the 
publicity that these tax assessments generated, “California had [actually] been 
taxing nonresident athletes as early as 1968, while New York has been doing 
so since 1971.”16 
Although athletes have been subject to non-resident income taxes for 
many years, Tennessee’s version is unique.  First, the tax is a flat tax as 
opposed to a tax based on a percentage of income or some other relevant tax 
base.17  Second, the tax is assessed only on athletes performing services in the 
NBA and NHL, but not in the National Football League (NFL).18  Those 
athletes who perform services under a minor league contract—or under a two-
way contract but who have not been on the roster for more than ten days 
during the tax year—are exempt from the Tennessee Professional Privilege 
 
12.  NOTICE 09-13, supra note 7. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Alan Pogroszewski, When is a CPA as Important as Your ERA? A Comprehensive 
Evaluation and Examination of State Tax Issues on Professional Athletes, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
395, 395 (2009). 
16.  Id. (citing In re Partee, 1976 Cal. Tax LEXIS 35 (Bd. of  Equalization Oct. 6, 1976); In re 
White, No. TSB-H-80-(93)-I, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 535, at *1–3 (Tax Comm’n June 20, 1980)).  For 
a more informative breakdown on the history of the taxation of non-resident athletes, see id. 
17.  NOTICE 09-13, supra note 7. 
18.  See id. 
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Tax.19 
III.  CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Although Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the dual 
sovereignty of the states and the federal government,20 the Supreme Court has 
on many occasions invalidated state tax measures on constitutional grounds.  
What has evolved is a rich body of case law—albeit confusing and often 
inconsistent—21in which the Supreme Court has developed a framework for 
determining the constitutionality of state tax measures under both the Due 
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. 
A.  Due Process 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits 
states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”22  The Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is a venerable if 
trite observation that seizure of property by the State under pretext of taxation 
when there is no jurisdiction or power to tax is simple confiscation and a 
denial of due process of law.”23  In determining whether a state has the 
jurisdiction to impose a tax, the Court will adhere to a “time-honored concept: 
that due process requires some definite link, some minimum connection, 
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.”24 
Nevertheless, there has been some inconsistency in the Court’s rulings as 
to the minimum connection required between the state and a person in order 
for the state to have jurisdiction to impose a tax on him.25  Consider, for 
instance, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue in which the 
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a use tax on sales the taxpayer 
 
19.  Id. 
20.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
21.  Even the Supreme Court has observed: 
Our decisions are not always clear as to the grounds on which a tax is supported, 
especially where more than one exists; nor are all of our pronouncements during the 
experimental period of this type of taxation[, use tax,] consistent or reconcilable.  A few 
have been specifically overruled, while others no longer fully represent the present state 
of the law. 
Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954). 
22.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
23.  Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 342. 
24.  Id. at 344–45. 
25.  See John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy 
Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 321, 365–73 (2003) for an in-depth discussion of nexus in 
the context of state taxation. 
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made within the state.26  The Court held that the minimum connection required 
by the Due Process Clause is the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state.27  
The Court revisited the issue, however, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, noting 
that “due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the [twenty-five] 
years since Bellas Hess.”28  It held that physical presence was not required.29  
Rather, “there is no question that Quill . . . purposefully directed its activities 
at North Dakota residents [and] that the magnitude of those contacts is more 
than sufficient for due process purposes . . . .”30  Thus, for purposes of 
imposing a use tax, the minimum contact required between the taxing state and 
a person is the person’s “economic” presence within the state. 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the Due Process requirements 
for a professional privilege tax like Tennessee’s, Tennessee imposes the tax 
only on those professional athletes who are performing services inside the 
state’s borders.  Therefore, it appears that there is a sufficient connection 
between the athlete and the state, whether it is measured by the physical 
presence standard articulated in National Bellas Hess or by the more flexible 
standard articulated in Quill Corp., such that the athlete has an economic 
presence in the state of Tennessee.  Tennessee’s jock tax does not seem to 
violate the Due Process Clause. 
The question that remains, then, is whether Tennessee’s Professional 
Privilege Tax can be successfully challenged under the Commerce Clause. 
B.  The Commerce Clause 
The framework for determining the constitutionality of a state tax under 
the Commerce Clause has evolved over the years, and there are several key 
 
26.  See generally Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled 
by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
27.  Id. at 758.  The taxpayer in question was a mail order company.  Id. at 753.  Because it had 
no contact with the state other than deliveries made through the U.S. mail and common carrier, the 
Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had no physical contact with the state, and thus the state use tax 
was unconstitutional.  Id. at 758. 
28.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992). 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. at 308.  The Court actually stated that “there is no question that Quill has purposefully 
directed its activities at North Dakota residents, that the magnitude of those contacts is more than 
sufficient for due process purposes, and that the use tax is related to the benefits Quill receives from 
access to the State.”  Id. (emphasis added).  However, the last requirement—that the tax is related to 
the benefits the taxpayer receives from his access to the state—is not actually a requirement under the 
Due Process Clause.  See id. at 307–08.  The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, apparently 
confused the requirements of the Due Process Clause with those of the Commerce Clause.  See 
Brandon F. White, Case Note, State Taxation on the Privilege of Doing Interstate Business: Complete 
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 19 B.C. L. REV. 312, 323 n.81 (1978). 
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points.  First, the Supreme Court’s decisions respond to very specific state tax 
measures.31  Because Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is unique, there 
are no cases that specifically address the constitutionality of this particular tax.  
Another important point, however, is that all state taxes are subject to scrutiny 
under the Commerce Clause using the very same analytical framework.  Its 
purpose is to prevent state regulation from impeding interstate commerce.32 
A third and related point is that the name of the tax is immaterial in 
determining its constitutionality.  Rather, it is the effect of the tax that will 
determine whether it is unconstitutional.33  This is important because the 
Tennessee tax is a so-called “privilege of doing business” tax.34  In Complete 
Auto Transit v. Brady, there was no objection to the sales tax in question other 
than the fact that it was called a privilege of doing business tax.35  Because the 
tax was not challenged on any other grounds, it was upheld.36  Complete Auto 
Transit is not authority for the proposition that Tennessee’s Professional 
Privilege Tax is constitutional.  It simply underscores the importance of 
evaluating the effects of the tax in determining its constitutionality. 
Complete Auto Transit is important for another reason.  It is a landmark 
case in which the Supreme Court provided an analytical framework for 
determining the constitutionality of a state tax under the Commerce Clause.  In 
order to be valid, the Supreme Court held that a state tax must be “applied to 
an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [must be] fairly 
 
31.  The Supreme Court has remarked, “[W]e have described our own decisions in this area as a 
‘quagmire’ of judicial responses to specific state tax measures . . . .”  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) (citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 
450, 457–58 (1959)). 
32.  See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312; see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274, 278 (1977). 
“[T]he Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for 
the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force 
created an area of trade free from interference by the States.  In short, the Commerce 
Clause [. . .] is a limitation upon the power of the States. . . . This limitation on State 
power . . . does not merely forbid a State to single out interstate commerce for hostile 
action.  A State is also precluded from taking any action which may fairly be deemed to 
have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between States.  It is immaterial that 
local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance.” 
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 278 n.7 (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946), 
overruled on other grounds by Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995)). 
33.  See Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 288 (“There is no economic consequence that 
follows necessarily from the use of the particular words, ‘privilege of doing business,’ and a focus on 
that formalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect.”). 
34.  Id. at 289. 
35.  See id. 
36.  Id. 
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apportioned, [must] not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [must 
be] fairly related to the services provided by the State.”37 
1.  Substantial Nexus with the Taxing State 
“Nexus” actually has two distinct meanings for state tax jurisdiction: (1) 
nexus with the taxpayer and (2) nexus with the income, transaction, activity, or 
property sought to be taxed.38 
In Section II.A we examined nexus with the taxpayer—the minimum 
connection between the state and a person that is required in order for the state 
to have the jurisdiction to impose a tax on him—within the context of the Due 
Process Clause.  The purpose of the Due Process Clause, however, differs 
significantly from that of the Commerce Clause.  The former ensures that 
taxpayers are fairly warned that they may be subject to a state’s taxing 
jurisdiction.39  The latter prohibits states from overreaching and interfering 
with interstate commerce.40  Therefore, the nexus requirement of each clause 
may differ significantly. 
So, what is the nexus with the taxpayer that is required under the 
Commerce Clause?  As it relates to state sales and use tax, the Supreme Court 
in Quill Corp. stated that the taxpayer has to have some physical presence in 
the state.41  However, it suggested that the standard for taxes other than sales 
and use tax may not be physical presence, implying that a taxpayer’s economic 
presence may be enough.42  The result is that there is a great deal of 
uncertainty as to the applicable standard for other state taxes, including state 
income tax, and state courts are divided as to whether the standard is physical 
presence or mere economic presence.43  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has 
not answered the question.44 
Notwithstanding, Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is assessed to 
NHL and NBA athletes, like Jon DiSalvatore, who play a game in the state of 
Tennessee.  To the extent that the athlete is present in the state at the time he is 
 
37.  Id. at 279. 
38.  See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 6.01 (3d ed. 
1998). 
39.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992). 
40.  Id. at 309. 
41.  See id. at 312–13. 
42.  See id. at 317. 
43.  Swain, supra note 25, at 321–22. 
44.  See id. at 321, 339–43 (explaining that the Supreme Court's exploration of the constitutional 
limits of income tax jurisdiction has been stymied by Congress’s enactment of legislation as an 
affirmative exercise of its Commerce Clause powers). 
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performing services, there is sufficient nexus under either standard. 
The other distinct meaning of nexus in the context of state tax jurisdiction 
concerns whether there is a sufficient connection between the state and the 
income, transaction, activity, or property it seeks to tax.45  This is consistent 
with the first part of the four-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Complete Auto Transit—that the state tax must be applied to an activity that 
has substantial nexus with the taxing state.46  We shall see, however, that 
while the Supreme Court articulated four seemingly different parts to its four-
part test, the parts are very much interrelated.  For example, whether there is 
sufficient nexus with the income, transaction, or activity sought to be taxed is 
usually viewed as a fair apportionment issue.47  We turn to the fair 
apportionment requirement next. 
2.  The Tax is Fairly Apportioned 
The purpose of the fair apportionment requirement is to ensure that a state 
taxes no more than its “fair share” of an interstate activity.48  In determining 
whether a tax is fairly apportioned, the Supreme Court has articulated two 
separate tests: the “internal consistency” test and the “external consistency” 
test.49 
The internal consistency test focuses on the potential strain that a state tax 
might place on interstate commerce.50  It examines whether the state tax 
measure, if adopted by all fifty states, would result in heavier taxes being 
imposed on interstate commerce than if the commerce was purely intrastate.51  
If the state tax measure places interstate commerce at a disadvantage, then it is 
invalid under the Commerce Clause because it interferes with free trade 
among the different states.52  The purpose of internal consistency, then, is to 
 
45.  HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 38, at ¶ 6.01. 
46.  See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
47.  See Swain, supra note 25, at 328–29. 
For example, the state of Arizona may have nexus with Acme Copper Company, but it 
could not impose a severance tax measured by the copper that Acme extracts in Chile.  
The question in this example is not whether Acme has Arizona nexus—it clearly does—
but whether the object or measure of the tax may be fairly apportioned to Arizona, i.e., 
whether the severance of Chilean copper has an Arizona nexus. 
Id. at 329 n.36. 
48.  See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the Prohibition on 
Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 157–58 (2002). 
49.  Id. at 156. 
50.  See id. 
51.  Id.; see Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 296 (1987). 
52.  See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 296. 
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ensure that the state tax measure does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce—the third prong of the Complete Auto Transit test.53  Here, again, 
we see that the four seemingly different prongs of the Complete Auto Transit 
test are very much interrelated. 
The external consistency test, on the other hand, focuses on whether the 
state has a valid claim to the value it is taxing or whether it is reaching beyond 
the value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within its borders.54  In 
other words, it attempts to limit the value that is being taxed to the amount 
with which the state has sufficient nexus.55  If each state taxes only that 
portion of the value of the income, transaction, or activity fairly attributable to 
economic activity within its jurisdiction, the taxpayer should not be subject to 
state taxation on more than 100% of the total value.56  Thus, the purpose of 
external consistency is to eliminate the risk of multiple taxation.57 
In American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, the Supreme Court 
determined that two different tax measures imposed on trucking businesses by 
the State of Pennsylvania—a “marker fee” and an “axle tax”—58were 
unconstitutional.59  Unlike a fuel consumption tax that is directly apportioned 
to the mileage traveled in Pennsylvania, the taxes in question were flat taxes, 
and the lack of apportionment doomed them to fail under the “internal 
consistency” standard.60  “[T]heir inevitable effect [was] to threaten the free 
movement of commerce by placing a financial barrier around the State of 
Pennsylvania.”61  The Court held that “[i]f each State imposed flat taxes for 
the privilege of making commercial entrances into its territory, there is no 
conceivable doubt that commerce among the States would be deterred.”62  The 
Court also acknowledged that it is not necessary for other jurisdictions to 
actually impose a similar tax in order to prove that interstate commerce is at a 
disadvantage.63  It did note, however, that the adoption of a similar tax 
 
53.  See id. at 281 (“In its guarantee of a free trade area among States, however, the Commerce 
Clause has a deeper meaning that may be implicated even though state provisions, such as the ones 
reviewed here, do not allocate tax burdens between insiders and outsiders in a manner that is facially 
discriminatory.”). 
54.  See Joondeph, supra note 48, at 150, 158. 
55.  See id. 
56.  Id. 
57.  See id. 
58.  See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 271. 
59.  See id. at 269. 
60.  See id. at 283–84. 
61.  Id. at 284. 
62.  Id. 
63.  See id. at 285. 
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measure by other jurisdictions even before the lawsuit was resolved “surely 
suggest[ed] that acquiescence in these flat taxes would occasion manifold 
threats to the national free trade area.”64 
While the Court focused largely on the internal consistency issues posed 
by the Pennsylvania tax, it did acknowledge another important concern.  The 
parties stipulated that if all states imposed the same flat tax, the cost for the 
taxpayer to qualify its trucks in every state in which it drove would amount to 
a total tax “many times larger” than the company’s net pretax income for the 
year in question.65  This certainly poses a serious external consistency issue. 
The Tennessee Professional Privilege Tax is similarly unapportioned and 
poses serious issues under both the internal consistency and external 
consistency standards.  It imposes a flat $2,500 tax to NHL and NBA players 
on a per game basis, up to a maximum of $7,500.66  If, as the Supreme Court 
asserted in Scheiner, every jurisdiction “imposed flat taxes for the privilege of 
making commercial entrances into its territory,”—in this instance, to play in 
the NHL or NBA—”there is no conceivable doubt that commerce among the 
States would be deterred” and that “acquiescence in these flat taxes would 
occasion manifold threats to the national free trade area.”67  The Tennessee 
Professional Privilege Tax thus violates the internal consistency standard. 
Recall that the external consistency test focuses on whether the state has a 
valid claim to the value it is taxing or whether it is reaching beyond the value 
that is fairly attributable to economic activity within its borders.68  It attempts 
to limit that value to the amount with which the state has sufficient nexus.69  
Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is a flat tax, and thus, there is a total 
lack of apportionment.  It raises serious questions as to the value that 
Tennessee is taxing and whether that value is fairly attributable to economic 
activity within its borders.  The tax, thus, violates the external consistency 
standard. 
It is important to note at this juncture that state taxes have been upheld, in 
a few exceptional cases, “as ‘fairly apportioned’ even though the taxes at issue 
were, in actuality, completely unapportioned.”70  These cases presented 
circumstances in which fair apportionment was “administratively cumbersome 
 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. at 285 nn.19–20. 
66.  NOTICE 09-13, supra note 7. 
67.  See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 284–85. 
68.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
69.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
70.  Joondeph, supra note 48, at 151. 
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or impractical.”71  In upholding the state tax measures, there were two key 
considerations for the Court: that the tax did not discriminate against interstate 
commerce and that it was not excessive, reflecting a “fair, if imperfect, 
approximation” of the benefit conferred.72 
This was the Court’s ruling in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority 
District v. Delta Airlines, Inc.73  The tax in question was a $1 fee imposed by 
the government for each passenger boarding a commercial aircraft operating 
from the airport.74  Even though the $1 fee was unapportioned, it was upheld 
because it satisfied two essential conditions in that it was neither 
discriminatory nor excessive.75  The Court held that the fee did not 
discriminate against interstate commerce because there were no inherent 
differences between interstate and intrastate flights, and both were subject to 
the same $1 charge.76  Nor was the charge excessive inasmuch as it 
“reflect[ed] a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose 
benefit they are imposed.”77 
In contrast, the Scheiner Court held that the Pennsylvania flat tax satisfied 
neither of these two essential conditions.78  It “discriminate[d] against out-of-
state vehicles by subjecting them to a much higher charge per mile traveled in 
the State, and [it did] not even purport to approximate fairly the cost or value 
of the use of Pennsylvania’s roads.”79  Much the same can be said of the 
Tennessee Professional Privilege Tax.  It discriminates against non-resident 
athletes by subjecting them to a much higher charge per game than resident 
athletes.  Compare, for instance, the $2,500 fee paid per game by a non-
resident athlete who plays 3 games in Tennessee with the $182.53 fee paid per 
game by a resident athlete who plays 41 games in Tennessee.80  And does the 
tax even purport to approximate fairly the cost or value of the athlete’s use of 
Tennessee’s facilities?  We think not. 
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on fair apportionment as it 
 
71.  Id. 
72.  Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 717 
(1972). 
73.  See generally id. 
74.  Id. at 709. 
75.  Id. at 716–17, 719–20. 
76.  Id. at 717. 
77.  Id. 
78.  See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 290 (1987). 
79.  Id. 
80.  See infra Table II and Table III, which outline the per-game tax for a non-resident athlete 
performing services in the state of Tennessee in comparison to that of a resident athlete who plays a 
full season in the state. 
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pertains to state taxation of a professional athlete’s income, various state 
courts have provided some guidance.81  The overriding construct is that there 
is a reasonable attempt to realistically apportion income. 
For instance, in order for apportionment to be fair and justifiable, an 
appropriate apportionment factor should reflect the number of working days or 
games played within each jurisdiction in proportion to the total number of 
working days or total games in a season.82  In In re Partee, the California state 
court noted that although the “working-day” formula was appropriate for 
football, the “games-played” method may be more appropriate for other 
sports, including baseball, basketball, and hockey.83  Second, the 
apportionment formula should take into consideration the entire season, 
including both the preseason and any championship playoff games.84  
Although it is in the athlete’s self-interest to train year-round, his contract does 
not require it, and therefore, off-season training should not be included in the 
apportionment formula.85 
To illustrate the total number of working days in a season, which is the 
standard for apportioning income for players in the NHL, we will use as an 
example an athlete performing services with the Minnesota Wild during the 
2011–2012 NHL season.  The denominator in the apportionment factor would 
include the NHL preseason, which for the Minnesota Wild began on 
September 15, 2011, and would include all days through the last game day of 
the season, which was April 7, 2012.86  Thus, for apportionment purposes 
there was a total of 207 duty days for the 2011–2012 season. 
Finally, the apportionment formula should include all income associated 
with the performance of the athlete’s services, including salary, performance 
 
81.  See generally, e.g., Wilson v. Franchise Tax Bd., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282 (Ct. App. 1993); In 
re Foster, 1984 Cal. Tax LEXIS 18 (Bd. of Equalization Nov. 14, 1984); In re Partee, 1976 Cal. Tax 
LEXIS 35 (Bd. of Equalization Oct. 6, 1976); In re White, No. TSB-H-80-(93)-I, 1980 N.Y. Tax 
LEXIS 535 (N.Y. Tax Comm’n June 20, 1980); In re Dorsey, No. 87-I-168, 1989 Wis. Tax LEXIS 8 
(Tax App. Comm’n Mar. 17, 1989). 
82.  See In re Partee, 1976 Cal. Tax LEXIS 35, at *11–12. 
83.  Id.  The court justified their ruling with the wording in Partee’s contract that “require[d] 
each player to participate in practice sessions,” thus concluding “that professional football players are 
paid for practices and necessary travel, as well as for playing in games.”  Id. at *9. 
84.  See In re White, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 535, at *2–3.  The court ruled that since White was 
obligated to participate in spring training or face consequences, such as breach of contract, his salary 
and compensation should have taken into consideration the exhibition games, even though he was not 
paid directly for those games, as White had as much of a contractual and professional obligation to 
participate in exhibition games as he did in regular season games.  Id. 
85.  See Wilson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289. 
86.  See 2011–2012 Schedule, MINN. WILD, http://wild.nhl.com/club/schedule.htm (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2013). 
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bonuses, and signing bonuses.87  A signing bonus should be included in total 
income if the bonus received for signing the contract is either refundable (so 
that it is conditioned on the athlete’s performance of services under the 
contract) or is otherwise related to services performed over the length of the 
contract.88 
If Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is evaluated within the construct 
of a state income tax, the tax fails the fair apportionment requirement.  
Tennessee’s tax is a flat tax and thus does not even attempt to fairly apportion 
the income that an athlete earns.  Table II below illustrates the consequences 
for a hockey player who is employed by the Minnesota Wild of the NHL and 
earns the $525,000 league minimum while performing services over 207 days 
during the season.  As a result of the $2,500 flat tax, this particular player’s 
single game day in Tennessee will be taxed at a rate of 98.57%, a rate almost 
in excess of 100% of his daily income. 
Recall that whether a state tax measure is fairly apportioned is evaluated 
under both the internal consistency and external consistency standards and that 
the purpose of the external consistency standard is to eliminate the risk of 
multiple taxation.  Clearly, Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax violates the 
external consistency standard.  And even California, which has a maximum 
income tax on both residents and non-residents of 10.3%, falls well below the 
rate that Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax imposes on the athlete in our 
example. 
TABLE II 
Salary 
Total  
Tax 
Income  
Per  
Day 
Tennessee 
Privilege  
Tax per 
game 
Tax 
Rate 
Net per 
game 
$525,000.00 $2,500.00 $2,536.23 $2,500.00 98.57% $36.23 
$2,500,000.00 $2,500.00 $12,077.29 $2,500.00 20.7% $9,577.29 
$7,500,000.00 $2,500.00 $36,231.88 $2,500.00 6.9% $33,731.88 
It should also be noted that because the income is not apportioned, 
 
87.  In re Foster, 1984 Cal. Tax LEXIS 18, at *6–7 (Bd. of Equalization Nov. 14, 1984).  The 
court ruled that Foster’s “playing bonus [was] plainly distinguishable from [that of] a signing bonus 
as a matter of custom or practice . . . [, and] the disputed $400,000 portion of [Foster’s] salary clearly 
represented compensation for his services . . . ” and should be apportioned to the state of California.  
Id. 
88.  See In re Dorsey, No. 87-I-168, 1989 Wis. Tax LEXIS 8, at *10–13 (Tax App. Comm’n 
Mar. 17, 1989).  The court found compelling the fact that Dorsey’s contract stated his bonus was 
refundable should he fail to report or should he leave the team without its consent.  Id. at *10.  It 
concluded that the signing bonus represented income derived from a performance of personal 
services, and thus compensation of services that were performed within the state of Wisconsin; 
accordingly, the bonus should have been apportioned to the state.  Id. at *13. 
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individuals at different income levels bear significantly disproportionate tax 
burdens.  As illustrated in Table II, those athletes who earn the minimum 
salary bear the greatest tax burden in proportion to their income, while those 
who earn the greatest bear the least. 
3.  The Tax Does Not Discriminate 
The third part of the four-part test articulated in Complete Auto Transit is 
that the state tax cannot discriminate against interstate commerce.89  It 
prohibits discrimination in two very distinct ways.  First, “‘a State may not tax 
a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it 
occurs entirely within the State.’”90  Second, it must not discriminate against 
interstate commerce by interfering with free trade.91  It is this guarantee of free 
trade that is ensured, in part, by Complete Auto Transit’s fair apportionment 
requirement discussed above. 
In Scheiner, the Supreme Court determined that two Pennsylvania state 
tax measures that imposed a flat marker fee and a flat axle tax on trucking 
businesses were unconstitutional because they discriminated against interstate 
commerce.92  Specifically, the marker fee discriminated against interstate 
commerce by imposing a heavier burden on out-of-state carriers; the flat tax 
was “plainly discriminatory” because the practical effect was to “impose a cost 
per mile on [the out-of-state taxpayer] that [was] approximately five times as 
heavy as the cost per mile borne by local trucks.”93  This discrimination 
against interstate commerce was in violation of the Commerce Clause.  In 
addition, the Supreme Court held that the flat axle tax discriminated against 
interstate commerce by impermissibly interfering with free trade.94  “If each 
State imposed flat taxes for the privilege of making commercial entrances into 
its territory, there is no conceivable doubt that commerce among the States 
would be deterred.”95 
The Tennessee Professional Privilege Tax has the same discriminatory 
 
89.  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
90.  See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) (quoting Bos. Stock 
Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977)). 
91.  See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 281 (“In its guarantee of a free trade area among States, however, 
the Commerce Clause has a deeper meaning that may be implicated even though state provisions, 
such as the ones reviewed here, do not allocate tax burdens between insiders and outsiders in a 
manner that is facially discriminatory.”). 
92.  Id. at 271, 297. 
93.  Id. at 286. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. at 284. 
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effects on interstate commerce as did the Pennsylvania flat tax in Scheiner.  As 
illustrated in Table III, the $2,500 flat tax results in a much greater tax burden 
on professional hockey players who are non-residents of Tennessee as 
opposed to those who are residents. 
TABLE III 
Salary 
Total  
Tax 
Income  
Per  
Day 
Tennessee 
Privilege  
Tax per 
game 
Tax 
Rate 
Net per 
game 
$525,000.00 $7,500.00 $2,536.23 $182.93 7.21% $2,353.31 
$2,500,000.00 $7,500.00 $12,077.29 $182.93 1.51% $11,894.37 
$7,500,000.00 $7,500.00 $36,231.88 $182.93 0.50% $36,048.96 
A professional hockey player who plays for the Nashville Predators and is 
a resident of Tennessee is subject to a flat tax of $2,500 for each game he 
plays in Tennessee, up to a maximum of three games.  The maximum tax is 
thus $7,500.  However, he will play forty-one games in Tennessee.96  If we 
allocate the total $7,500 tax over all forty-one games, the result is that he is 
subject to a pro-rated tax of $182.93 per game.  This is considerably less than 
the $2,500 tax that a non-resident athlete is assessed per game.97  At every 
income tax level, resident athletes thus pay significantly less tax per game than 
non-residents. 
Tennessee’s flat tax is analogous, then, to the flat tax in Scheiner, which 
the Supreme Court found to be plainly discriminatory—the practical effect 
was to burden the out-of-state taxpayer with a cost that was approximately five 
times the cost imposed on the in-state taxpayer.98  In the case of Tennessee’s 
Professional Privilege Tax, the tax is actually 13.67 times the cost imposed on 
the in-state taxpayer.  The Supreme Court also admonished that “acquiescence 
in these flat taxes would occasion manifold threats to the national free trade 
area[,]” a clear violation of the Commerce Clause.99 
 
96.  Half the games an NFL team member plays are in his resident state.  Notice that the tax is 
assessed on a per game basis but that an NHL player’s income is apportioned on a duty day basis 
using the total number of days over the length of a hockey season.  Therefore, the salary for a game 
day would be equal to the player’s total salary divided by the total number of days in the season, in 
this case 207. 
97.  In practice, NHL players who are members of a team other than the Nashville Predators are 
non-residents of Tennessee.  Non-resident athletes playing in the NHL or the NBA are generally not 
scheduled to play in more than three games in any given regular season in the state of Tennessee, 
which happens to be the maximum number of games for which a player can be assessed the $2,500 
per game tax. 
98.  Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 286. 
99.  Id. at 285. 
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Finally, Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is discriminatory 
inasmuch as it only pertains to resident and non-resident professional athletes 
who perform services for the NHL and the NBA but fails to subject the same 
tax on athletes who perform services for the NFL. 
4.  The Tax Must Be Fairly Related to the Services Provided 
The Supreme Court “has acknowledged that ‘a State has a significant 
interest in exacting . . . its fair share of the cost of state government.’”100  A 
state 
“[I]s free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by 
the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state 
has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has 
given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it 
has conferred by the fact of being an orderly civilized 
society.”101 
However, the fourth part of Complete Auto Transit’s test imposes an 
important limitation: the tax must be fairly related to the services that the state 
provides.102  While this suggests that the measure of the state tax must be 
fairly related to the value of the services provided, the Supreme Court later 
expanded on the fairly related requirement and interpreted it to mean that that 
the tax must be “assessed in proportion to a taxpayer’s activities or presence in 
a State . . . .”103  The requirement is thus closely connected to the first prong of 
the Complete Auto Transit test—that is, the nexus requirement.104  It is the 
taxpayer’s activities or presence in the state, then, that should bear a “‘just 
share of state tax burden.’”105 
However, there is an important exception to this rule.  To the extent that a 
state tax measure is levied on the use of particular public facilities (a “user 
tax”), the tax is evaluated under a very different standard. 
[A] user tax is valid only if it is related to the cost to the state 
of the benefit provided to the taxpayer: 
 
100.  Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981) (quoting Dep’t of 
Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978)). 
101.  Id. at 625 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)). 
102.  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
103.  Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 627; see also R. Douglas Harmon, Note, Judicial 
Review Under Complete Auto Transit: When Is a State Tax on Energy-Producing Resources “Fairly 
Related”?, 1982 DUKE L.J. 682, 683. 
104.  Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 625–26. 
105.  Id. at 626 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)). 
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“[W]hile state or local tolls must reflect a ‘uniform, fair 
and practical standard’ relating to public expenditures, it 
is the amount of the tax, not its formula, that is of central 
concern.  At least so long as the toll is based on some fair 
approximation of use or privilege for use . . . and is . . . 
[not] excessive in comparison with the governmental 
benefit conferred, it will pass constitutional 
muster . . . .”106 
Recall, then, the Court’s ruling in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport 
Authority District, in which the government imposed a $1 user fee for each 
passenger boarding a commercial aircraft departing from the airport.107  The 
$1 fee was upheld, even though it was unapportioned, because it satisfied two 
essential conditions: it was neither discriminatory nor excessive.108  The 
charge, the Court held, was not excessive inasmuch as it “reflect[ed] a fair, if 
imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they [were] 
imposed.”109 
Tennessee’s assessment of a $2,500 per game tax looks less like an 
income tax—particularly in light of the fact that it is completely 
unapportioned—and much more like a user tax.  In this context, the amount of 
the tax is relevant—and the fact that a $2,500 per game fee is assessed raises 
serious concerns about whether it is a fair approximation of the use or 
privilege for use of the state’s sports facilities.  It also raises serious concerns 
as to whether the fee is excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit 
conferred. 
In any event, the evaluation of Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax 
under the fairly related requirement does not change the fact that the tax is 
discriminatory. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
After having $2,500 withheld from his paycheck, Jon DiSalvatore was 
later reimbursed because he was not on the Minnesota Wild roster for more 
than ten days during the tax year and was thus exempt from the Tennessee 
Professional Privilege Tax.  Others are not so lucky.  A professional athlete 
who earns the minimum salary in the NHL and performs services in the state 
 
106.  Harmon, supra note 103, at 694 (quoting Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. 
Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 716–17 (1972)). 
107.  See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport, 405 U.S. at 709. 
108.  Id. at 716. 
109.  Id. at 717. 
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of Tennessee—that is, he shows up on game day—will owe more in taxes than 
what he earned that day. 
Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax fails Commerce Clause scrutiny 
because it is not fairly apportioned, it is discriminatory, and it is not fairly 
related to the services provided by the state of Tennessee.  The tax is therefore 
unconstitutional and puts the state in serious jeopardy of potential lawsuits 
from both the NHL Players’ Association and National Basketball Player’s 
Associations.  More importantly, Tennessee’s flat tax cannot be tolerated 
because it will open the floodgates to other discriminatory state tax measures.  
In the words of the Supreme Court, “acquiescence in these flat taxes would 
occasion manifold threats to the national free trade area,” which is a clear 
violation of the Commerce Clause.110 
 
 
110.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 285 (1987). 
